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In the landscape of modern theology, John D. Zizioulas is noted for his con-
tribution in retrieving the works of the Cappadocian Fathers in the areas 
of Trinitarian theology and ontology of personhood. Disenchanted by the 
predominance of Augustinian “Substantialism”, which he claims to place 
too much emphasis on the unity of God, Zizioulas turns to the ideas of the 
Cappadocian Fathers in order to offer a “Personalist” approach in Trini-
tarian theology. Such an approach, in turn, leads to the development of a 
particular ontology of personhood, in which Person is understood both as 
hypostasis and ekstasis. This article appropriates Zizioulas’ conception of 
person to provide an ontological justification for the idea of democracy. 
Zizioulas’ conception of “Person” as hypostasis can form the ontological 
ground for the notion of equality, whereas his idea of “Person” as ekstasis 
offers the ground for the cultivation of a democratic political culture, in 
which communion with the “Poor and Suffering Other” is not simply a theo-
logical possibility, but a civic duty.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War in the twilight 
of the twentieth century, liberal democra­
cy was widely perceived as the model of 
governance par excellence. Calls for de­
mocratization echoed in many countries. 
The dream for global peace under the blan­
ket of democracy, however, was quickly 
shattered by the surging wave of identity 
politics. As this frequently manifests in le­
thal acts of violence which beset the pro­
cess of democratization, proponents of de­
mocracy cannot but engage in the common 
endeavor to tackle these challenges and 
provide a stronger ground for democracy. 
Due to its faith in the Incarnate God whose 
salvific work takes place in the flow of his­
tory, Christianity and the Catholic Church 
cannot but be involved in this collective act 
of revitalizing demo cracy. Such an involve­
ment can materialize either into a move­
ment to support pluralism and democracy 
or in the form of a theological reflection. 
As it seeks to offer a theological justifica­
tion for democracy, the aim of this article is 
clearly the latter. 
JURNAL TEOLOGI  07.02 (2018): 105-122
H. Angga Indraswara: Reinterpreting Democracy Through Zizioulas’ Ontology of Personhood106
To achieve this aim, this article seeks to 
unearth the riches of early Christian theolo­
gy and demons trate its significance in help­
ing democracy counter the challenges posed 
by identity politics. As a starting point, it will 
look into the work of John D. Zizioulas’ on 
the Cappadocian Fathers’ Trinitarian theol­
ogy. According to Zizioulas’, the Trinitarian 
theology of the Cappadocian Fathers gener­
ates an ontology which defines personhood 
as both hypostasis and ekstasis. These twin 
concepts will be appropriated in this article 
to present an ontological justification for the 
idea of demo cracy. Firstly, it will demonstrate 
that Zizioulas’ conception of “Person” as hy­
postasis can form the ontological ground for 
the notion of equality. Secondly, it will show 
that the idea of “Person” as ekstasis is equal­
ly important for it calls for the cultivation 
of a democratic political culture, in which 
communion with the “Poor and Suffering 
O ther” is not simply a theological possibility, 
but a civic duty. 
FROM A “SUBSTANTIALIST” TO A 
“PERSONALIST” THEOLOGY 
Zizioulas’ attempt to retrieve the Cap­
padocian Fathers’ ontology of personhood 
stems from his initiative to offer an alter­
native to the “Substantialist” approach in 
Trinitarian theology. According to Ziziou­
las’, Trinitarian theology in the Western 
Church has for far too long been predeter­
mined by Augustinian “Substantialism”.1 
The term refers to a specific approach in 
Trinitarian theology that is influenced by 
Greek ontology in such a way that it de­
scribes the being of God by giving ontolog­
ical priority to substance (ousia) over per­
sonal relations.2 Consequently, as Zizioulas’ 
contends, Western Trinitarian theology 
displays a tendency to overemphasize the 
unity or oneness of God at the expense of 
forming a sufficiently deep understanding 
of the relations amongst the persons of the 
Trinity. For Zizioulas’, the focus on the one­
ness of God has unwittingly made otherness 
secondary to oneness. 
The tendency to subordinate otherness, 
in Zizioulas’ view, has serious ramifica­
tions for the vitality of the Church. Given 
the prevalence of “Substantialism” in the 
Western Church, Zizioulas’ observes that 
“the West always started with the one God 
and then moved to the Trinity, whereas the 
East followed the opposite course … [Quite 
often, this] has amounted to the West’s be­
ginning and ending up with the one God 
and never actually arriving at the Trinity”.3 
Zizioulas’ claims that such a failure makes 
the Church bland and dour, for it exagger­
ated the importance of unity and underrat­
ed the worth and richness of otherness. Ec­
clesiologically, this manifests in a penchant 
for bestowing ontological priority to the 
universal church over the local church.4 
Not infrequently, this means the imposition 
of the view of the universal Church on the 
local Church.5 As the emergence of local 
initiatives is curbed, the local Church grad­
ually loses its otherness, and with that, the 
vibrancy of its heritage.
Against this backdrop, Zizioulas’ calls for 
the retrieval of a “Personalist” approach to 
the doctrine of God. To achieve this aim, he 
turns mainly to the ideas of the Cappadocian 
Fathers, namely St. Basil the Great, bishop 
of Caesarea in Cappadocia (c.330­379), St. 
Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 330­89/90), who 
became bishop for a brief a time in Sassi­
ma, Cappadocia and then Archbishop at 
Constantinople, and St. Gregory of Nyssa 
(c. 335­394), the younger brother of St. 
Basil.6 In the history of Christianity, these 
three Church Fathers are revered mainly for 
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their decisive contribution in giving the final 
shape of the doctrine of the Trinity.7 The im­
portance of their idea was such that Ziziou­
las’ regards their influence as a “theolo gical 
and philosophical originality” that “sealed 
the entire history of Christian thought” and 
“ignited ‘a radical reorientation of classical 
Greek thought’”.8
The Cappadocians left their indelible 
mark in the history of Christian doctrine 
primarily through their redefinition of the 
term hypostasis. Prior to their interven­
tion, in Greek speaking Christianity the 
terms ‘ousia’ and ‘hypostasis’ essentially 
meant the same thing.9 Both referred to a 
general metaphysical category which des­
cribed the unchanging being or what is 
underlying and fundamental within each 
individual thing.10 As a result, the Church 
could not find a proper formulation to ex­
press its faith in the Trinitarian God. When 
the Cappadocians burst on the theological 
landscape, however, they provided a break­
through by distinguishing the terms ‘hy­
postasis’ and ‘ousia’, so that the two would 
no longer be regarded as synonyms. From 
then on, the Latin word ‘substantia’ was 
translated into Greek as ousia (in English, 
it would either be ‘substance’ or ‘nature’), 
whereas the term ‘hypostasis’ would mean 
‘person’.11 By doing so, they disassociated 
the term ‘hypostasis’ from ‘ousia’ and iden­
tified it with ‘prosopon’ – a term which is 
per definition relational. “This meant that 
from now on a relational term entered into 
ontology and, conversely, that an ontolog­
ical category such as hypostasis entered 
the relational categories of existence. To be 
and to be in relation becomes identical.”12 
Henceforth, the term person acquired an 
ontological significance, and this is why 
Zizioulas’ defines his theological approach 
as “Personalism”.
For this redefinition to be successful, 
however, the Cappadocians had to be able to 
provide a satisfying answer to the problem 
of reconciling the idea of three persons and 
the oneness of God. To solve this riddle, the 
Cappadocians suggested that ousia (sub­
stance) or physis (nature) is a general cat­
egory, whereas hypostases refer to concrete 
individuals.13 This allows them to speak of 
God as one substance and three hypostases 
through the analogy of three men. Such an 
analogy, however, could have been e asi ly 
misunderstood as tritheism. 
To avoid it, the Cappadocians carefully 
de lineated the being of man and the being 
of God. God and man are differentiated by 
the eternality of God’s existence and the 
temporality of human existence.14 As cre­
ated being are bound by time and space, 
humans share the human nature, which 
pre­exists before each particular individ­
ual. The divine nature, in contrast, does 
not precede the three divine persons, be­
cause God is beyond the confines of time 
and space.15 Since God did not have a be­
ginning, the three divine persons do not ex­
ist prior to their divine nature, but coincide 
with it.16 As Zizioulas’ affirms, “God is not 
first one and then three, but simultaneously 
One and Three”.17 Unlike humans who are 
divided into individuals, the three persons 
of the Trinity are united in an unbreakable 
communion. None of the divine persons 
can be conceived without the others. More 
importantly, this shows that communion is 
itself ontological.
Zizioulas’ regards the solution provided 
by the Cappadocians as an “ontological rev­
olution”. By redefining the term “hyposta­
sis”, the Cappadocians presented a defini­
tive solution to the puzzle of reconciling the 
oneness of God and the faith in the Trini­
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tarian God. More importantly, however, they 
revealed that to be relational is inherent in 
the personhood of God.18 This was possible 
because the Cappa docians identified God’s 
being not with substance (ousia), but with 
person (hypostasis), and that is the person 
of the Father. Zizioulas’ would utilise this 
breakthrough as the foundation of his “per­
sonalist” approach to the Trinity and his on­
tology of personhood, which encompasses 
both divine and human personhood.
DIVINE PERSONHOOD 
Zizioulas’ concept of personhood begins 
with his conceptualisation of God the Father 
as Divine Person. He asserts that by rede­
fining the meaning of hypostasis, the Cap­
padocians rescued Christianity from being 
hijacked by Hellenistic monistic philosophy 
which attributed God’s being to one sub­
stance and salvaged the Biblical conception 
of God as a Person.19 For the Cappadocians, 
as Zizioulas’ contends, it is God as person 
that forms the divine substance of the one 
God, and that person is the hypostasis of 
the Father.20 In short, divine substance is 
constitu ted of the personal existence of God 
the Father. For Zizioulas’, this point is of ab­
solute importance. “If we allow for anything 
beyond the Father as ultimate rea lity,” he 
asserts, “we must bear in mind that biblical 
monotheism is at stake … in the Bible, God 
is the Father.”21 
For Zizioulas’, this paradigm shift entails 
understanding God’s being in terms of ‘how 
God is’, instead of ‘what God is’. To ask ‘what 
God is’ means inqui ring the nature of God’s 
being in general. It cannot be otherwise be­
cause in Greek philosophical parlance, the 
question of what refers to the substance, or 
ousia of a being.22 Citing Gregory Nazianzus, 
Zizioulas’ argues that humans cannot possi­
bly know ‘what’ God is since that would en­
tail a mastery of God.23 It is possible, how­
ever, for humans to comprehend ‘how God 
is’. “God is God as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit – these persons indicate how God is,” 
writes Zizioulas’.24 In other words, ‘how God 
is’ can be grasped from seeing the relations 
between the persons in the Tri nity.25 
What becomes clear by asking the ques­
tion of ‘how God is’, for Zizioulas’, is that 
causality in God’s being belongs not to sub­
stance (ousia), but to the hypostasis of God 
the Father. To say that causality belongs to a 
divine substance means that creation exists 
because it participates in the true being of 
God.26 This Hellenistic account of creation, 
in Zizioulas’ observation, is problematic 
since that would mean God and creation 
are somehow joined with an “ontological 
affinity”. “This would make God a Creator 
by necessity and the world not ultimately ot­
her than God”.27 To safeguard the doctrine 
of creation ex nihilo, the Cappadocians at­
tributed causality not to a divine substance, 
but to the person of the Father, who creates 
out of love and freedom.28 God the Father 
as a person, therefore, is the “personal on­
tological origination” who caused the other 
two persons – the Son and the Holy Spirit 
– to be distinct hypostases.29 This is an act 
of personal freedom by God the Father as 
the arche (source) in the Trinity. It is with 
this personal freedom as well that God the 
Father created the world.
The last point is of particular signifi­
cance. As the foregoing discussion reveals, 
Zizioulas’ account of the Trinity emphasises 
the unbreakable relations between the per­
sons. The point about the monarchia of the 
Father, however, reveals something founda­
tional about the meaning of “Person”. The 
person of the God the Father reveals that 
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personhood by definition entails generating 
otherness, while simultaneously being in 
communion. Communion with otherness, 
however, does not entail the disintegration 
of the Person. Personhood, therefore, con­
sists of two interlocking notions, namely an 
existential individuation of being or partic­
ularity and self­transcendence towards the 
other. The first refers to the idea of hypo­
stasis, whereas the second to ekstasis. It is 
these two concepts that form the heart of 
Zizioulas’ understanding of human person­
hood.
HUMAN PERSONHOOD 
The foregoing discussion Zizioulas’ no­
tion of divine personhood forms the back­
drop of his concept of human personhood. 
For Zizioulas’, human personhood is onto­
logically derived from divine personhood, 
since humans are made in the image of God 
(Gen 1:28). “Because man is made in the 
image of God,” he asserts, “we can find anal­
ogies between God and man, that are based 
in the relationships of the persons of God. 
The doctrine of the Trinity gives us the truth 
of our own existence.”30 For this reason, 
Zizioulas’ argues that human personhood 
should not be understood in terms of being 
a personality, which denotes a complex set 
of natural, psycholo gical, or moral qualities. 
Conversely, as it is the case with the per­
sons of the Trinity, a human person is – and 
can only be – conceived insofar as it “relates 
to”.31 To be in relation, therefore, is just as 
ontolo gically constitutive of human person­
hood as it is of divine personhood.
As human personhood is relational, it 
cannot be understood without two inter­
locking characteristics: ekstasis and hypos­
tasis. For Zizioulas’, personhood implies not 
merely ‘openness of being’ to other beings, 
but ‘ek­stasis’ or “a movement towards com­
munion”.32 This is possible because human 
personhood implies the freedom and love 
to transcend beyond the boundaries of the 
‘self ’. A human person is simultaneously a 
gift of love and freedom from other persons 
and a gift of love and freedom for other per­
sons. Human personhood, therefore, exists 
insofar as the person is in communion with 
others. This communion, however, does not 
necessarily imply that the human person 
will disappear, because he/she is also a hy­
postasis. “Personhood,” he writes, “is about 
hypostasis, that is, the claim to uniqueness 
in the absolute sense of the term”.33 
Ekstasis and hypostasis as two interlock­
ing aspects of human personhood, there­
fore, are not contradictory. On the con­
trary, “[S]tasis’ (being ‘as it stands’, as it is 
‘in itself ’) is realised in personhood both as 
ek­stasis (communion, relatedness) and as 
hypo­stasis (particularity, uniqueness)”.34 
In this light, particularity or uniqueness and 
communion with the “Other” do not threat­
en each other, but point to the fullness of 
human personhood. In Zizioulas’ frame­
work, this appears when a person success­
fully performs the leap from ‘the hypostasis 
of biological existence’ to ‘the hypostasis of 
ecclesial existence’. 
For Zizioulas’, humans are born as the 
hypostasis of biological existence. He ex­
plains that the birth of a man is always the 
product of a communion between two peo­
ple.35 A human, however, is not born as a 
person, but rather as an individual.36 This 
is because a human is tied to two passions, 
which destroy the finality towards which the 
human hypostasis is oriented. Firstly, a man 
is tied by a passion, which Zizioulas’ defines 
as “ontological necessity”. As the human 
hypostasis is tied to “the natural instinct, 
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to an impulse which is necessary, a man 
subsists not as freedom, but as necessity.37 
Secondly, a man is entrapped by a passion, 
which Zizioulas’ calls “individualism”. Here, 
Zizioulas’ own explanation deserves to be 
quoted at length: 
The biological constitution of the human 
hypostasis, fundamentally tied as it is to 
the necessity of its ‘nature’, ends in the 
perpetuation of this ‘nature’ through the 
creation of bodies, that is, of hypostatic 
unities which affirm their identity as sepa­
ration from unities or ‘hypostases’. The 
body, which is born as a biological hyposta­
sis, behaves like the fortress of an ego, like 
a new ‘mask’ which hinders the hypostasis 
from becoming a person, that is, from af­
firming itself as love and freedom.38
It is the biological constitution of the 
body as an individual, therefore, which 
hampers human beings from actualising 
their personhood.39 Ultimately, this mate­
rialises in death, which Zizioulas’ considers 
as the ultimate barrier for human beings 
from actualising their personhood. Death 
is  thus not merely biological.40 It is onto­
logical, for death deforms personhood and 
turns it into nothingness. 
The main cause behind the tragedy of hu­
man as the hypostasis of biological existence 
is sin. For Zizioulas’, sin needs to be cons­
trued primarily as the perversion of human 
personhood.41 It entered as idolatry, which 
is “an ekstasis of communion with the crea­
ted world alone”.42 Consequently, sin rup­
tures communion between human and God 
and between the created world and God, for 
humans are the mediator between creation 
and God. The presence of sin in the fallen 
state of existence turns the human capaci­
ty for ekstasis into apostasis (distance) and 
difference (diaphora) into division (diaire­
sis).43 This is why in the postlapsarian world 
otherness is feared and the human commu­
nity is divided. Sin begets division. 
As sin is construed as the rupture of 
communion, salvation consists in the res­
toration of human personhood. Salvation, 
for Zizioulas’, takes place when the ‘hypos­
tasis of biological existence’ is transformed 
and regenerated into a new ‘mode of exis­
tence’, namely the ‘hypostasis of ecclesial 
existence’. This new mode of existence is 
the salvation of mankind because it enables 
the restoration of human communion with 
God and with other humans. 
The birth of this new mode of existence 
comes through baptism.44 In Zizioulas’ view, 
baptism is of absolute importance because 
it is “a new birth, not from below or from 
‘blood from the will of the flesh nor from 
the will of man’ (John 1:13), that is, from 
nature, but ‘from above’ (John 3:3), that is, 
from the Spirit (John 3:5­6)”.45 What this 
means is that through baptism, man is in­
corporated in Christ. As Zizioulas’ asserts, 
the essence of baptism is the “adoption of 
man by God, the identification of his hy­
postasis with the hypostasis of the Son 
of God”.46 He can thenceforth “subsist”, 
since his hypostasis is no longer based on 
his biological­ontological necessity, but on 
a personal relationship with God through 
the hypostasis of Christ. It is this personal 
relationship that affirms man as a person 
and allows him to escape the perils of in­
dividualism and death and enter into com­
munion with God.47 Baptism, for Zizioulas’, 
is therefore the constitutive sine qua non of 
salvation, as it breaks open the condition of 
possibility for man to participate in the life 
of God (theosis).48
Given the centrality of baptism in Ziziou­
las’ schema, it goes without saying that this 
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new hypostasis is realised in history only in 
the Church. For Zizioulas’, the Church is 
first and foremost a “mode of existence”, 
which brings man into a relationship with 
the created world in a way that is not de­
termined by ontological necessity.49 It is the 
Church that makes it possible for men and 
women to be persons. The constitutive role 
of the Church in the attainment of human 
personhood stems from the function of the 
Church, i.e. incorporating humans into the 
corporate body of Christ. For Zizioulas’, 
this does not mean the dissolution of hu­
man personhood, but rather its fulfilment. 
In fact, it is its salvation because unity with 
Christ means the participation of the hu­
man person in the Son’s relation with the 
Father.50 The fullness of this communion 
and otherness materialises in the Eucharist, 
because the particularity or new being that 
Baptism gives is given its fulfilment by com­
munion in the Eucharist. “What baptism 
initiates, therefore, the Eucharist fulfils”.51 
For Zizioulas’, therefore, there is no 
personhood outside the Church (extra ec­
clesia nulla personas). He describes the 
new ‘mode of existence’ as the hypostasis 
of ecclesial being for this very reason. In 
his schema, it is only as a member of the 
Church can a human transcend the ex­
clusivism of his/her ontological necessity 
which leads to individualism and death. 
The Church, as the corporate body of Christ 
in the Eucharistic communion, therefore, 
is for Zizioulas’ the “exclusion of exclusion 
itself, that is, of those things that involve 
rejection and division”.52
COMMUNION WITH THE “OTHER”: 
A THEOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY AND A 
POLITICAL DUTY
Zizioulas’ Trinitarian theology reveals 
that the Christian conception of personhood 
is composed of two intertwining dimensions, 
namely hypostasis and ekstasis. These two 
concepts, I now contend, can be used to pro­
vide the foundation for envisaging a Chris­
tian politico­theological vision. To convey 
this point, in the following reflection I will 
seek to demonstrate that the notion of “Per­
son” as hypostasis can be extrapolated to 
serve as an ontological justification for the 
creation of a democratic political structure 
which safeguards the idea of equality and 
that the idea of “Person” as ekstasis can be 
employed to call for a political culture, in 
which communion with the “Poor and Suf­
fering Other” is understood as a civic duty.
Person as Hypostasis and a Democratic 
Political Order
Throughout his theological corpus, 
Zizioulas’ incessantly insists that ontologi­
cally a human individual should be under­
stood not as an ousia (substance), but ra­
ther as a hypostasis (person). The rationale 
for endowing ontological priority to hyposta­
sis over ousia stems from his noble wish to 
safeguard the sacredness of human being as 
the imago Dei. According to Zizioulas’, if a 
human being is ontologically defined as an 
ousia, he/she will be perceived merely as a 
constitutive element of the general human 
nature, instead of a distinct person. Prima 
facie, this appears as a benign philosophical 
discourse. Nonetheless, since ontological 
definition cannot but determine ethical con­
duct, what initially appears as nonthreaten­
ing can easily become lethal. The idea that 
a human being is merely a mani festation of 
the general human nature can easily lead 
to the erroneous thinking that he/she is re­
placeable, and thus, can be treated as an in­
strument to achieve a particular purpose. As 
Zizioulas’ warns sternly, “Whosoever treats 
a person in such ways automatically turns 
him into a thing”.53 Surely, no human be­
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ing desires and deserved to be treated as a 
means to an end.
To avoid this danger, Zizioulas’ empha­
tically states that every human being is first 
and foremost a hypostasis. As a hypostasis, 
every human is unique, unrepeatable, and 
thus irreplaceable. Moreover, since the on­
tological origination of every human person­
hood is the Person of God the Father through 
the Person of Christ, every human being 
is also sacred.54 Such an ontology, in turn, 
generates an ethical imperative not only to 
protect, but also to foster the flourishing of 
every human person, even if he/she appears 
as the “Other”.55 This ontology of person­
hood, I contend, forms the ontological jus­
tification for the notion of equality, which is 
at the heart of a democratic political order. 
Nevertheless, before I proceed with my 
theoretical reflection, it is pertinent to raise 
a critical note towards Zizioulas’ ontology of 
personhood. In his schema, Zizioulas’ clas­
sifies humans into two categories, namely 
the ‘hypostasis of biological existence’ and 
the ‘hypostasis of ecclesial existence’. As 
several commentators have argued, this 
rigid classification is problematic.56 With­
out a doubt, Zizioulas’ asserts that all hu­
mans can perform the leap from being an 
individual (the ‘hypostasis of biological ex­
istence’) to a person (the ‘hypostasis of ec­
clesial existence’).57 Nonetheless, it is cru­
cial to emphasise that for Zizioulas’ human 
personhood can only be achieved through 
baptism. Human personhood exists only “in 
ecclesia”.58 Outside the Church there is no 
personhood (extra ecclesia nulla personas). 
Since Zizioulas’ equates salvation with the 
attainment of human personhood, the claim 
extra ecclesia nulla personas inevitably sug­
gests a literal interpretation of extra eccle­
sia nulla salus (outside the Church there 
is no salvation). A modification is therefore 
required.
To move away from Zizioulas’ question­
able theological anthropology, it is of para­
mount importance to acknowledge that eve­
ry human is already a person prior to his/
her baptism and formal entrance into the 
Church. As Zizioulas’ correctly insists, hu­
man personhood is the result of a personal 
relationship with Christ. His oversight, how­
ever, is to claim that humans can only relate 
to Christ within the confines of the Church. 
To assert this claim is to give too much em­
phasis on the signifier, i.e. the Church as the 
sacrament of salvation, and too little credit to 
the signified, i.e. Christ as the saviour of all 
mankind.59 Christ, after all, is greater than 
his Church. His Spirit transcends the for­
mal boundaries of the institutional Church 
and touches upon the innermost sanctum 
of every human person. To modify Zizioulas’ 
ontology of personhood, therefore, requires 
swaying the emphasis from ecclesiology to 
pneumatology.
To allow every human individual to be 
perceived as “Person” by virtue of his/her 
relation with Christ, it is necessary to un­
derscore the universal presence of the Holy 
Spirit. The argument goes as follows: If God 
desires the salvation of all people through 
Christ (cf. 1Tim 2:4), and if the Holy Spirit 
is no other than the Spirit of Christ (John 
7:37­39; 19:30, 34; 20:22), and if the Holy 
Spirit dwells in every man and woman by 
virtue of his/her created existence60, then 
any acceptance of the Holy Spirit, whether 
explicit or implicit, is always an acceptance 
of Christ.61 Such a point is affirmed in one 
of the foundational documents promulgat­
ed by the Second Vatican Council, Gaudi­
um et Spes: “the Holy Spirit offers to all the 
possibility of being made partners, in a way 
known to God, in the paschal mystery” of 
Christ (art. 22). The grace of the Holy Spirit 
is always and everywhere invisibly active in 
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all men and women of goodwill, and because 
of this, they are all related to Christ. It is this 
relationship with Christ, whether explicit or 
implicit, that makes every man and woman 
a person. 
As this matter is clarified, a question can 
now be raised: What is the political impli­
cation of affirming the personhood of every 
man and woman?
To affirm every man and woman is a per­
son, who is in one way or another related to 
Christ, is to make the theological claim that 
every man and woman is equal before God. 
As the saviour of mankind, Christ, through 
his life, death and resurrection, has brought 
forth a new “mode of being”, which allows 
all humans to participate in the divine life of 
the Triune God.62 The bestowal of this new 
“mode of being” to all men and women is po­
litically significant because it abolishes any 
human justification for stratification. That 
is why Paul insists, “Here there cannot be 
Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircum­
cised, barbarian, Scyth’ian, slave, free man, 
but Christ is all and in all” (Col 3:11). As 
Pokorný explains, the word “here” refers to 
Pauline idea that the salvific work of Christ 
brings about a “new nature”, in which men 
and women are in communion with Christ.63 
It is this very communion with Christ that 
forms the innermost core of human’s new 
mode of being. Since this touches upon eve­
ry man and woman, it follows that before 
God all men and women are equal. 
This theological vision that all men and 
women as persons are equal before God pro­
vides the ontological foundation for the crea­
tion of a democratic political order in which 
everyone is equal before the law. Without a 
doubt, it is clear that in the history of politi­
cal thought, the notion of equality before the 
law and the idea of democracy had already 
emerged prior to the event of Jesus Christ. 
As formal historical record shows, democra­
cy first came into being in ancient Athens. 
In this city­state, as politicians sought to 
mediate the bitter conflicts between wealth­
ier landowners and poorer families, a new 
way of governing was invented.64 Instead of 
allowing the nobility to decide on and enact 
the laws of the polis solely based on their 
interests, they proposed the idea of direct 
participation, whereby citizens met to de­
bate, decide and enact the law.65 As a result, 
lawmaking was no longer in the hands of the 
few elites who could justify any law that fa­
voured them on the grounds of custom or 
brute force, but rather in the hands of those 
who could put forward a better argument for 
the sake of the common good.66 Eventually, 
this mode of governance acquired a name of 
its own: demokratia or literally power in the 
hands of the demos – the people as a whole – 
and not simply in the hands of the nobility.67 
Their initiative brought about a revolution, 
because they championed the idea that ev­
eryone’s judgment deserves equal weight in 
the shaping of a community and in the exer­
cise of power.68 Nevertheless, in spite of its 
novelty, it is crucial to remember that par­
ticipation in political life in ancient Athens 
was limited to male citizens. Women, slaves 
and aliens were excluded. In other words, 
democracy in ancient Athens still treated 
certain people as the “Other”. 
By insisting upon the ontological equality 
of all men and women as persons, howev­
er, the justification for such an exclusion is 
immediately shattered. Paul’s idea – which 
corresponds to Zizioulas’ notion of “Person” 
as hypostasis – that every person is equal 
before God by virtue of his relationship with 
Christ means that in a political polity every­
one should be treated equally before the law. 
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But, what does equality before the law 
means? It means that every person as a cit­
izen is endowed with the same right and 
duty to participate in political processes. No 
person, insofar as he/she meets the require­
ments stipulated in the Constitution of the 
state can be excluded from its political pro­
cesses. If a democratic political order com­
mits such an act of exclusion, it effectively 
derails its legitimacy. In fact, it threatens its 
raison d’être because a democratic political 
order is only legitimate insofar as it is con­
ducted in consultation with every person 
equally.
The notion of “Person” as hypostasis, 
therefore, is indispensable for the creation 
of a political structure that fosters democ­
racy. To emphasise the importance of this 
point, a brief recapitulation can be helpful. 
If every human is a person by virtue of his/
her explicit or implicit relationship with 
Christ, then every human is equal before 
God. If every human person is equal before 
God, then every human person should also 
be treated equally before the law. In con­
crete terms, this means that every person is 
endowed with the right and duty to partici­
pate in the shaping of the community and 
in the exercise of political power. This is the 
essence of the political structure which peo­
ple now call “democracy”. This is also why I 
contend that the Christian theological vision 
that every human is a person can provide 
the ontological justification for the creation 
of a democratic political order.
At this point, it is perhaps useful, howev­
er, to raise a critical question to test whether 
this proposal is sufficient to solve the rid­
dle of otherness which becomes particularly 
enigmatic with the rise of religious puritan­
ism and identity politics in the twenty­first 
century. Is safeguarding the participation of 
every person in a democratic political order 
sufficient? To provide an adequate answer 
to this question, it is necessary to briefly 
consider the state of democracy as it is pres­
ent today. 
In the modern world, with the expansion 
of political polities under the Westphalian 
model of nation­state, democracy gradual­
ly materialised into a representative form. 
Representative democracy, as it exists to­
day, hinges upon a procedure known as vo­
ting. The rationale behind the use of voting 
is that this mechanism sustains the notion 
of equality by allowing citizens to exercise 
their political right through casting ballots to 
elect representatives, who will subsequently 
deliberate legislations for them.69 In other 
words, voting ensures that the democratic 
government derives its authority from citi­
zen electors, and that electors have effective 
control over the laws to which they are sub­
ject, and the persons who make, interpret 
and enforce those laws upon them.70 Rep­
resentative democracy, therefore, ensures 
the creation of a political structure, which 
minimises the possibility of exclusion.
In recent decades, however, it has be­
come increasingly apparent that represen­
tative democracy alone as a political struc­
ture is insufficient. In the early years of the 
twenty­first century, the re­emergence of 
dualism materialises in the rise of identi­
ty politics in many nation­states across the 
globe. As Wiarda explains, identity politics 
are “political arguments emanating from the 
self­interested perspectives of self­identified 
societal interest groups … in ways that peo­
ple’s politics are shaped by these narrower 
(non­national) aspects of their identity.71 
With the rise of identity politics, the common 
good of the nation­state is threatened by the 
emergence of groups who call for the imple­
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mentation of policies and laws, which only 
represent their narrow interests.72 Hence, a 
democratic political structure alone, even if 
it has ensured the participation of all per­
sons in political processes, in and of itself is 
apparently not enough to prevent exclusion. 
To be able to function optimally, it needs to 
be complemented by a political culture that 
is based on the idea that “Person” is also ek­
stasis.
Person as Ekstasis and a “Communing” 
Political Culture
The threat posed by the surging wave 
of identity politics in the early hours of the 
twenty­first century suggests that structure 
in and of itself is inadequate to sustain a 
democratic political order. For a democratic 
polity to function well, a democratic politi­
cal culture also has to be cultivated amongst 
its inhabitants. In other words, democracy 
is not merely a modus operandi, but also a 
modus vivendi which requires constant nur­
turing. To aid this cultivation process, the 
notion of “Person” as ekstasis can offer a 
distinctively Christian contribution vis­à­vis 
the communing process of a political polity. 
As the term “communing” instead of “com­
munion” suggests, insofar as this endeavour 
takes place in the fallen world, it remains 
a never­ending process marred by setbacks. 
As Zizioulas’ asserts, the concept of eks­
tasis essentially indicates a person’s move­
ment towards communion. As a hypostasis, 
a person is indeed ontologically a unique be­
ing. Nonetheless, since a person is also an 
ekstasis, he/she is also ontologically orien­
ted towards communion with the “Other”. 
“To be and to be in relation is identical,” as 
Zizioulas’ claims.73 A person is thus is a hy­
postasis in search of communion with the 
“Other”. This longing for communion, how­
ever, can only be fulfilled if a person is able 
to transcend the boundaries of his/her in­
dividual existence. Without the act of tran­
scending one’s own cocoon, no communion 
is possible. Movement towards communion 
and transcending one’s boundaries are two 
sides of the same coin called ekstasis. 
To grasp the Christian meaning of ek­
stasis, it is helpful to turn to the teachings 
of Jesus as articulated in the Gospel. In the 
Gospel according to Luke, Jesus tells a par­
able widely known as the “Parable of the 
Good Samaritan” (Luke 10:25:31). It comes 
as a response to a question posed by a law­
yer: “Who is my neighbour?” (Luke 10:29). 
The parable then tells the story of a man 
(presumably Jewish) assaulted on his way 
to Jericho and left for dead on the roadside. 
The parable states that a priest and a Levite 
walk down the same road but decide to pass 
him by. Afterwards, a Samaritan appears to 
help the wounded man. Up to this point, 
the parable seems to indicate that one’s 
neighbour is the man in need. Jesus, how­
ever, had something else in mind. Much to 
the surprise of the lawyer, Jesus asks him, 
“Which of these three, do you think, proved 
neighbour to the man who fell among the 
robbers?” (Luke 10:36). By doing so, Jesus 
shifts the attention to the lawyer himself. 
Stunned by Jesus’ question, the lawyer hes­
itantly answers, “The one who showed mer­
cy on him?” (Luke 10:37). 
Through this parable, Jesus challenges 
the prevailing mindset of the lawyer. One’s 
neighbour is indeed a category that can be 
applied to anyone who is in need. But, the 
genius of the parable is to reveal that, first 
and foremost, the definition of one’s neigh­
bour needs to be applied not to others, but 
to oneself as a moral agent, who is capable 
either of being or of failing to be a neigh­
bour to a suffering other.74 With it comes a 
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clear moral imperative: One is called to be 
a neighbour to a suffering “Other”.
Furthermore, this parable is particularly 
apt to challenge the worldview of puritanical 
religious believers because it juxtaposes the 
issue of religious purity with the command­
ment to love a suffering neighbour. The para­
ble offers a detailed description of how the 
man “fell among robbers, who stripped him 
and beat him, and departed, leaving him half 
dead” (Luke 10:30). Such a detailed narra­
tive cannot but invoke the audience’s imagi­
native empathy with the wounded man. It is 
against this backdrop that the priest and the 
Levite decides to walk on the other side of 
the road and pass by the wounded man. By 
doing so, they make a practical decision to 
ignore the suffering of the wounded man for 
the sake of keeping purity laws.75 The audi­
ence was then given an unpleasant surprise 
when they heard that the third person was 
a Samaritan. After the mention of a priest 
and a Levite, they expected the third person 
to be an Israelite.76 Instead, it was a Samari­
tan, whom the Jews hostilely viewed as the 
“Other”. Here it is pertinent to note that the 
lawyer could only say, “The one who showed 
mercy on him?” The contempt of the Jews 
towards the Samaritans was such that he 
could not even bring himself to mention the 
name of the group.77 But, in the present par­
able, he, the one usually portrayed as the 
“Evil Other” by the Jewish people, appears 
to be the one who obey the commandment 
to love the neighbour (cf. Lev 19) by help­
ing the wounded man. As his actions are de­
scribed in detail, the audience are undoubt­
edly invited to identify themselves with him. 
This is where the evocative power of 
the parable lies. It begins by invoking the 
audience’s imaginative empathy with the 
suffering man and concludes by creating 
within the audience’s mind an imaginative 
identification with the Samaritan. Once the 
audience is engaged with this two­layered 
imagination, they will find it hard to fathom 
the decision of the priest and the Levite to 
ignore the suffering of the wounded man. 
Moreover, even though they resent the Sa­
maritan’s ethnicity and religious affiliations, 
they cannot but agree with his actions, which 
corresponds to Moses’ commandment: “If 
you see the donkey of one who hates you ly­
ing under its burden, you shall refrain from 
leaving him with it, you shall help him to lift 
it up” (Exodus 23:5). When a person is in 
need of help, the covenant solidarity binds 
every other person to help him/her. What 
this parable also reveals is also the capaci­
ty of every person to transcend the narrow 
boundaries of one’s religious affiliation for 
the sake of helping a suffering “Other”. In 
the light of this parable, therefore, ekstasis 
means a call to love and to move towards 
communion with the “Poor and Suffering 
Other”. 
Ekstasis as movement towards commu­
nion with the “Poor and Suffering Other” in­
jects democracy with the Christian vision of 
preferential option for the poor. As a political 
structure, democracy, particularly represen­
tative democracy, is by design doomed to be 
haunted by the possibility of being hijacked 
by the majority and transformed into a mere 
political procedure to legitimately impose 
their wish on the minority, be it in the area 
of politics, socio­economics, cultures and 
religion.78 Left to its own devices, democra­
cy can end up severely hurting the dignity 
of the human person. To alleviate this struc­
tural problem, democracy needs to be con­
ceived as a modus vivendi (way of life) which 
seeks to safeguard the voice of the minority, 
and especially the suffering people. Here, 
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the notion of ekstasis as movement towards 
communion with the “Poor and Suffering 
Other” inculcates a democratic political or­
der with a particularly significant idea that 
ultimately the criterion of good governance 
is the extent to which a democratic regime 
can improve the wellbeing of the poor.79 A 
democratic political order that is supported 
by the Church, therefore, is one that gives 
preferential option for the poor.
But how does preferential option for the 
poor solves the impasse created by identi­
ty politics? It does so by generating a pow­
erful reminder that prior to his/her other 
layers of identity, a poor and suffering per­
son is first and foremost a neighbour to be 
helped. In short, it engenders a culture of 
solidarity. As John Paul II explains in Sol­
licitudo rei socialis, the virtue of solidarity 
is “a firm and persevering determination to 
commit oneself to the common good”.80 In 
other words, solidarity is the visceral desire 
to pursue the good for others even at the ex­
pense of forsaking convenience and narrow 
self­interest.81 Seen in this light, it is clear 
that solidarity is not simply the call to make 
sacrifices, but an ongoing commitment to 
building communities wherein people of all 
backgrounds can attain authentic develop­
ment. Such a politico­theological vision does 
not see the world as divided into the “Good 
Us” and the “Evil Other”. Rather, it sees the 
world as place where humans are called to 
share life with the “Poor and Suffering Oth­
er”. 
The inextricable link between preferen­
tial option for the poor and solidarity, there­
fore, shows that imagining “Person” as ek­
stasis can be a foundation for the cultivation 
of a communing political culture. Within 
this politico­theological vision, humanity is 
seen as one, united by a shared commitment 
to lift the lives of “the least of [the Lord’s] 
brethren” (Matthew 25:40). Such a vision 
generates a political culture in which com­
munion with the “Other”, especially the 
“Poor and Suffering Other”, is understood 
and embraced as a civic duty. A civic duty, 
by nature, binds all members of a political 
polity to fulfil it. As such, communion with 
the “Poor and Suffering Other” is no longer 
a mere theological possibility. It is also a po­
litical duty.
CONCLUSION
As this article has suggested, Trinitarian 
theology is not and cannot be understood 
merely as a speculative theological enter­
prise. Trinitarian theology has serious im­
plications for the vitality of the Church and 
the vibrancy of shared life in the political 
sphere. Zizioulas’ understood this point, 
and that is precisely why he seeks to offer 
an alternative to the predominant Substan­
tialist approach in Trinitarian theology. His 
effort prompts him to retrieve the heritage 
of the Cappadocian Fathers. According to 
the Cappadocian Fathers, God’s being is not 
a substance, but the Person of the Father, 
whose ekstasis causes the other two divine 
Persons to be distinct hypostases. Since hu­
mans are made in the image of God, human 
personhood for Zizioulas’ is also composed 
of hypostasis and ekstasis. 
These two constitutive elements were 
then employed to offer an ontological justi­
fication for the concept of democracy. First­
ly, this article contends that the concept of 
“Person” as hypostasis can be utilised to 
provide an ontological justification for the 
notion of equality, which forms the heart of 
every democratic political order. Secondly, it 
suggests that the notion of “Person” as ek­
stasis is necessary for the cultivation of a 
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political culture, which seeks communion 
with the “Other” by emphasising the idea 
that lifting the lives of the “Poor and Suf­
fering Other” is not merely a theological 
possibility, but also a civic duty.
Certainly, this is a long and arduous 
journey for cultivating communion has 
always been one of the greatest tasks be­
stowed upon mankind. Nonetheless, as 
Pope Francis reminds us, “time is greater 
than space”.82 This principle presents a viv­
id reminder on the importance of avoiding 
short term solutions to fill up the space 
that lies before us. Instead, one is called 
to concentrate his/her effort on initiating 
long­term processes that will bear fruit 
in time. This article, therefore, does not 
pretend to be a solution, for it is merely a 
meek effort to participate in the ongoing 
politico­theological conversation by sug­
gesting that communion with the “Other” 
is both a theological possibility and a civic 
duty. Precisely because of that, it is fitting 
to end this article by proffering a firm and 
definitive answer to the question raised by 
Cain after murdering his brother: “Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” (Gen 4:9). To him, and 
to all who doubt our shared humanity, this 
article offers a direct riposte: “Yes, you are 
your brother’s keeper.”
ENDNOTES
1 Zizioulas’ writes, “… theology in the West, with the help 
of St. Augustine’s decisive influence, has developed a 
substantialist rather than a personalist approach to 
Trinitarian theology”. This has led to many divergences 
between the West and the East, including the dispute 
over the issue of the Filioque and the West’s tendency to 
prefer the theology of Athanasius than the Cappadocian 
Fathers. See John D. Zizioulas’, Communion and Other-
ness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2006), 124.
2 Christians of all ages always have to deal with the is­
sue of reconciling monotheism with the Trinitarian faith 
without ending up in polytheism. The Augustinian solu­
tion to this riddle, according to Zizioulas’, is to safeguard 
the one substance of God, the divinitas, by arguing that 
it precedes the three persons. For Zizioulas’, this makes 
“monotheism survives at the expense of Trinitarianism”. 
See ibid., 150.
3 To strengthen his argument, Zizioulas’ offers a number of examples which illustrate the failure of Western theology to arrive at an understanding of Trinity. These include the case of Deism and the ontological assumptions underlying modern atheism. For him, the question raised by modern form of atheism is the existence of God. This “to be or not 
be” question is fundamentally a substantialist problem, because it does not consider how God is. See ibid., 34; foot-note no. 62.
4 Based on his appraisal of Karl Rahner and Joseph 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, Zizioulas’ contends that the 
philosophical justification for giving ontological priori­
ty to the universal Church over the local Church stems 
from the argument that the ‘one’ precedes the ‘many’. 
See ibid., 38.
5 To be fair, it needs to be noted that Rahner himself is 
critical towards the tendency to merely export the Eu­
ropean Church to other parts of the world. He writes, 
“the actual concrete activity of the Church in its rela­
tion to the world outside of Europe was in fact (if you 
will pardon the expression) the activity of an export firm 
which exported a European religion as a commodity it 
did not really want to change but sent throughout the 
world together with the rest of the culture and civiliza­
tion it considered superior. In this light it does appear 
meaningful and justified to consider Vatican II as the 
first major official event in which the Church actualized 
itself precisely as a world Church (emphasis original)”. 
Karl Rahner, “Toward a Fundamental Interpretation of 
Vatican Ii,” Theological Studies 40, no. 4 (1979): 717.
6 Apart from these three, Zizioulas’ mentions a relative­
ly unknown figure in the Western Church, namely St. 
Amphilochius (340/45­?), bishop of Iconium. While the 
three Cappadocian Fathers left behind a large amount of 
work, St. Amphilochius’ work survives only in the forms 
of a limited number of homilies and letters. See Ziziou­
las’, 155. 
7 For a brief introduction to the ideas of the “Three Cap­
padocian Fathers”, see Bengt Hägglund, History of Theol-
ogy, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publish­
ing House, 1968), 84­85.
8 As cited in Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: 
The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2004). I am not unaware that Zizioulas’ interpretation 
of the Cappadocian Fathers have come under criticisms. It 
is not the scope of the present study, however, to discuss the 
validity of these criticisms. For a discussion of the critiques 
against Zizioulas’ interpretation of the Cappadocian Fathers, 
see Tingcui Jiang, “A Critical Study on Zizioulas’ Ontology of 
Personhood” (Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Hong 
Kong Baptist University, 2014), 56­65. 
9 John D. Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Per-
sonhood and the Church (Cretwood, NY: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1985), 87.
10 Zizioulas’ explains that the difficulty arose when Tertul­
lian’s phrase “una substantia, tres personae” was trans­
lated into Greek by Hippolytus. Tertullian’s choice of 
words presented an immense challenge, because the 
literal Greek translation for the Latin word ‘substantia’ 
was ‘hypostasis’. Likewise, if the term personae were 
translated directly, it would have to use the Greek word 
‘prosopon’ (the mask worn by actors in the theatres of 
ancient Greece). Using this term, however, runs the risk 
of suggesting that the three divine persons were merely 
façade of the one God. This is precisely the teachings of 
JURNAL TEOLOGI  07.02 (2018): 105-122
H. Angga Indraswara: Reinterpreting Democracy Through Zizioulas’ Ontology of Personhood 119
Sabellius, which had already been deemed as heretical. 
As such, the Greek speaking Christians chose to replace 
the term ‘person’ with ‘hypostasis’. But, once this is 
translated into Latin, it would become ‘tres substantiae’. 
The situation created a deadlock that would ultimately 
only be broken by the Cappadocian Fathers. See John D. 
Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics (Bloomsbury: 
T&T Clark, 2009), 49­50.
11 ibid., 50.
12 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 87­88.
13 Jiang, 46­47.
14 Grenz, 137.
15 Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 51.
16 Jiang, 47.
17 Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, 5.
18 Travis E. Ables, “On the Very Idea of an Ontology of 
Communion: Being, Relation and Freedom in Zizioulas’ 
and Levinas,” The Heythrop Journal LII (2011): 674.
19 ‘Monistic’ philosophy is a term used interchangeably 
with ‘Substantialism’ by Zizioulas’. He explains that 
in philosophical Hellenism God was understood as a 
monad or a self­sufficient unit. This originates from an­
cient Greek religious belief that God was simply one or 
alone (monos). Christian monotheism, however, is not 
the same, since in the Christian doctrine of God, “the 
number three represents particular beings in relation 
with one another”. For Zizioulas’, therefore, it would be 
mistake to develop a Christian doctrine of God out of 
monistic philosophy, because that would imply that the 
oneness of God is given priority over the personhood of 
God. See Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 49.
20 Edward Russell, “Reconsidering Relational Anthropolo­
gy: A Critical Assessment of John Zizioulas’s Theological 
Anthropology,” International Journal of Systematic Theolo-
gy 5, no. 2 (2003): 170.
21 Here, Zizioulas’ agrees with Karl Rahner, who empha­
sizes a similar point, that in the Bible, God is always God 
the Father. See Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: 
Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, 134, foot­
note no. 62.
22 Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 54.
23 This view is different with the tendency in Greek 
philosophy, which contends that the human mind can 
understand the essence of beings. The Greek Fathers, 
however, contended that while the human mind can 
understand the essence of a table, it cannot possibly 
comprehend the essence of God. Ibid., 58.
24 ibid., 57.
25 Drawing from the insight of Maximus the Confessor, 
Zizioulas’ emphasises the difference between nature 
(what) and mode of being (how – tropos). It is this 
difference that allows God to relate to the world 
without losing its otherness ontologically. See Zizioulas’, 
Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 22­29.
26 Zizioulas’ argues that the doctrine of creation was the 
first instance when Christian theology had to attempt to 
make a drastic revision to Greek ontology. In the latter, 
nothing can come out of nothing, whereas Christians be­
lieved that creation was ex nihilo. Ibid., 17, cf. foot note 
no. 9.
27 ibid., 16.
28 ibid., 34.
29 It is important to note that what the Father causes is a 
transmission of personal otherness (hypostasis) and not 
of ousia. This means that the Father causes the emer­
gence of otherness in divine being. See ibid., 119, 29­30.
30 Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 64.
31 Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, 212 (italics original).
32 ibid., 213.
33 ibid., 111.
34 ibid., 229, footnote no. 35.
35 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 50.
36 As noted by Brockman, Zizioulas’ distinguishes between 
the terms ‘individual’ and ‘person. He is highly critical 
of individualism, which for him is “a defective state of 
being—a kind of prison, the self turned in on itself, not 
free because not related. “Person”, conversely, refers to 
a conception of human being as derived from his Trin­
itarian theology. See David R. Brockman, Dialectical 
Democracy through Christian Thought: Individualism, Re-
lationalism, and American Politics (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 46­47. 
37 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 50.
38 ibid., 51.
39 It is pertinent to note that Zizioulas’ does not in any 
way reject the human body in a manner similar to 
the Gnostics. He contends that the human body is of 
paramount significance for the ontology of otherness, 
and that “Christian anthropology could not conceive 
human identity without the body”. Indeed, the role of 
the human body is such that Zizioulas’ contends that 
“the key to the resolution of the conflict cannot be found 
outside the body itself.” For this to occur, death needs to 
be conquered, and this is precisely what Christ achieved 
with his resurrection. See Zizioulas’, Communion and 
Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, 
61­62. 
40 ibid., 226­27.
41 Russell,  174.
42 Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, 228.
43 Russell,  174.
44 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 53­55.
45 Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, 80.
46 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 56.
47 As noted by Russell, “For Zizioulas’, the ‘quintessence’ of 
salvation consists in the eternal survival of the person as 
a unique, unrepeatable and free hypostasis … Salvation, 
therefore, can be understood as the realisation of 
personhood in human being.” See Russell,  173.
48 Zizioulas’, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 115.
49 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 56.
50 Russell,  175.
51 Zizioulas’, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, 80.
52 ibid., 7.
53 ibid., 167.
54 In a similar tone, the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
states, “Human life is sacred because from its beginning 
it involves the creative action of God and it remains for 
ever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its 
sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning 
until its end: no one can under any circumstance claim 
for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent 
human being”. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 
2258.
55 As Lisa Sowle Cahill explains, Matthew’s parable of 
Judgement Day (Matt 25:31­46) carries a powerful 
JURNAL TEOLOGI  07.02 (2018): 105-122
H. Angga Indraswara: Reinterpreting Democracy Through Zizioulas’ Ontology of Personhood120
message that ignorance or “the absence of imaginative 
empathy for others” is just as evil as causing others to 
suffer. As Matthew vividly illustrates, this is ultimately 
a rejection of Christ himself. As such, men and women 
are called not only to refrain from killing other human 
beings, or simply protecting their decaying existence, 
but to promote the flourishing of other human beings. 
See Lisa Sowle Cahill, “A Theology for Peacebuilding”, 
in Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. 
Powers, eds., Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics and 
Praxis (New York: Orbis Books, 2010), p. 304.
56 Cf. Russell,  181­85; Brockman, 54.
57 Ables argues that this assertion is actually in itself also 
problematic because it assumes that every hypostasis 
possesses the potency for becoming a person. But, is this 
not the classical notion of substance that Zizioulas’ pre­
cisely rejects? If so, then there is an inherent contradic­
tion within Zizioulas’ metaphysical schema. See Ables, 
675.
58 Russell,  182.
59 ibid., 179.
60 To assert the universal reach of the Holy Spirit, O’Col­
lins mentions the story of Peter’s encounter with Corne­
lius in Acts 10. Their encounter, as O’Collins explains, 
reveals that “the Spirit of Christ operates of baptized 
believers to bring others to Christ”. To say that the Holy 
Spirit is the “vital principle or ‘soul’ of the Church (see 
1 Cor 6. 6:19)” does not in any way mean that the pres­
ence and activity of the Spirit is confined to the Chris­
tian community. See Gerald O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeem-
er: A Christian Approach to Salvation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 226, 30.
61 It is pertinent to note that Neo­Scholastic theology dis­
tinguishes between gratia creata and gratia increata. 
In the opinion of Karl Rahner, following the teachings 
of Paul and the Church Fathers, gratia increata as the 
dwelling of the Holy Spirit in every man and woman is 
prevenient to the experience of justification and gratia 
creata or the fruit of the Spirit (cf. Gal 3:2­5). It is this 
prevenient grace that turns every human being into 
what Rahner calls “Supernatural Existential” or a be­
ing who actively searches for God as the fulfilment of 
his existence. See Karl Rahner, “Some Implications of 
the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,” in Theo-
logical Investigations, ed. and trans. Cornelius Ernst 
(Baltimore; London: Helicon Press; Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 1961), 325. See also Stephen J. Duffy, “Expe­
rience of Grace,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46­49.
62 In Pauline theology, this new “mode of being” is made 
possible by the work of justification done by Christ. Jus­
tification, for Paul, creates a new bond between man and 
God, whereby man is not only destined for God, but also 
oriented towards it. As Rahner insists, this orientation 
towards God is the result of grace as divine self­com­
munication and is present in every man and woman, in 
spite of their religious adherences. See John P. Galvin, 
“The Invitation of Grace”, Leo J. O’Donovan, ed. A World 
of Grace: An Introduction to the  Themes and Foundations 
of Karl Rahner’s Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 
72­74.
63 Pokorný explains that by using the work “Greek”, 
“barbarian”, “Scyth’ian”, Paul emphatically states that 
the salvific work of Christ goes beyond the “Jews”, who 
in the Old Testament were perceived as the exclusive 
recipient of God’s salvific plan. See Petr Pokorný, 
Colossians: A Commentary, trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann 
(Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publisher, 1991), 169­70.
64 See John Dunn, Setting the People Free: A Story of Democ-
racy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 25­35.
65 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge & Maiden: 
Polity Press, 2006), 15.
66 It is perhaps germane to mention that the majority of 
ancient Greek thinkers, including Pythagoras, Protago­
ras, Plato, Aristotle, and the sophists, were convinced 
that the happiness of man is achieved through his ac­
tive participation in the polis. It was only Epicurus who 
thought differently by depoliticizing the concept of hap­
piness and disassociating it from its traditional link to 
active citizenship. See Robert Pogue Harrison, Gardens: 
An Essay on the Human Condition (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 72­73.
67 Dunn, 34.
68 ibid.
69 Anthony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern 
Democracy, London, Routledge, 2007, Part 2: The Dem­
ocratic State and the Citizen. 
70 John Dunn, Setting the People Free: A Story of Democracy, 
pp. 162­164.
71 Howard J. Wiarda, Political Culture, Political Science, and 
Identity Politics: An Uneasy Alliance (Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2014), 148.
72 Wiarda explains that the term “identity politics” first 
came to the fore in the 1960s and 1970s as a way to raise 
the consciousness of marginalized groups. It is not clear 
which group first employed this term, but black people, 
women, transgender and homosexual groups frequently 
employ this term to designate their political movements. 
See ibid., 150­51.
73 Zizioulas’, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood 
and the Church, 88.
74 Ian A. McFarland, “Who Is My Neighbour?: The Good 
Samaritan as a Source for Theological Anthropology,” 
Modern Theology 17, no. 1 (2001): p. 60.
75 Amy­Jill Levine, “Go and Do Likewise: Lessons from the 
Parable of the Good Samaritan,” America, September, 
29, 2014.
76 ibid.
77 ibid.
78 Felix Wilfred, “Christianity and Global Democratic Pro­
cess,” Concilium 104­120 (2007): 113.
79 Felix Wilfred asserts that transforming democracy into 
a means of creating justice requires the election of 
representatives who are willing to stand for the interests 
of the poor who have always been marginalised. The 
representatives of the people are thus first and foremost 
the representatives of the poor people. See ibid., 114.
80 John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), no. 38.
81 Kenneth R. Himes, “Peacebuilding and Catholic Social 
Teaching”, in Schreiter, Appleby, and Powers, 273.
82 Francis, Evangelii Gaudium (2013), no. 222­23.
JURNAL TEOLOGI  07.02 (2018): 105-122
H. Angga Indraswara: Reinterpreting Democracy Through Zizioulas’ Ontology of Personhood 121
REFERENCES
Ables, Travis E. “On the Very Idea of an Ontol-
ogy of Communion: Being, Relation and 
Freedom in Zizioulas’ and Levinas.” The 
Heythrop Journal LII (2011): 672-83.
Brockman, David R. Dialectical Democracy 
through Christian Thought: Individual-
ism, Relationalism, and American Politics. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Duffy, Stephen J. “Experience of Grace.” In The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, 
edited by Declan Marmion and Mary E. 
Hines, 43-62. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
Dunn, John. Setting the People Free: A Story of 
Democracy. London: Atlantic Books, 2005.
Francis. Evangelii Gaudium. 2013.
Grenz, Stanley J. Rediscovering the Triune God: 
The Trinity in Contemporary Theology. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004.
Hägglund, Bengt. History of Theology. Translat-
ed by Gene J. Lund. St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1968.
Harrison, Robert Pogue. Gardens: An Essay on 
the Human Condition. Chicago and Lon-
don: The University of Chicago Press, 
2008.
Held, David. Models of Democracy. Cambridge & 
Maiden: Polity Press, 2006.
II, John Paul. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. 1987.
Jiang, Tingcui. “A Critical Study on Zizioulas’ On-
tology of Personhood.” Thesis submitted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Hong 
Kong Baptist University, 2014.
Levine, Amy-Jill. “Go and Do Likewise: Lessons 
from the Parable of the Good Samaritan.” 
America September, 29, 2014.
McFarland, Ian A. “Who Is My Neighbour?: The 
Good Samaritan as a Source for Theolog-
ical Anthropology.” Modern Theology 17, 
no. 1 (2001): 57-66.
O’Collins, Gerald. Jesus Our Redeemer: A Chris-
tian Approach to Salvation. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007.
O’Donovan, Leo J., ed. A World of Grace: An 
Introduction to the Themes and Founda-
tions of Karl Rahner’s Theology. New York: 
Crossroad, 1991.
Pokorný, Petr. Colossians: A Commentary. Trans-
lated by Siegfried S. Schatzmann. Massa-
chusetts: Hendrickson Publisher, 1991.
Rahner, Karl. “Some Implications of the Scholas-
tic Concept of Uncreated Grace.” In Theo-
logical Investigations. Edited and trans-
lated by Cornelius Ernst, vol 1. Baltimore; 
London: Helicon Press; Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 1961.
Rahner, Karl. “Toward a Fundamental Interpre-
tation of Vatican Ii.” Theological Studies 
40, no. 4 (1979): 716-27.
Russell, Edward. “Reconsidering Relational An-
thropology: A Critical Assessment of John 
Zizioulas’s Theological Anthropology.” In-
ternational Journal of Systematic Theolo-
gy 5, no. 2 (2003): 168-286.
Schreiter, Robert J., R. Scott Appleby, and Ge-
rard F. Powers, eds. Peacebuilding: Catho-
lic Theology, Ethics and Praxis. New York: 
Orbis Books, 2010.
Wiarda, Howard J. Political Culture, Political 
Science, and Identity Politics: An Uneasy 
Alliance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014.
Wilfred, Felix. “Christianity and Global Dem-
ocratic Process.” Concilium 104-120 
(2007).
Zizioulas’, John D. Being as Communion: Studies 
in Personhood and the Church. Cretwood, 
NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985.
Zizioulas’, John D. Communion and Otherness: 
Further Studies in Personhood and the 
Church. New York: T&T Clark, 2006.
Zizioulas’, John D. Lectures in Christian Dog-
matics. edited by Douglas H. Knight. 
Bloomsbury: T&T Clark, 2009.
JURNAL TEOLOGI  07.02 (2018): 105-122
H. Angga Indraswara: Reinterpreting Democracy Through Zizioulas’ Ontology of Personhood122
